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Abstract
Consider a wireless broadcast device-to-device (D2D) network wherein users’ devices are interested
in receiving some popular files. Each user’s device possesses part of the content which is acquired
in previous transmissions and cooperates with others to recover the missing packets by exchanging
Instantly Decodable Network Coding (IDNC) packets. Recently, a distributed solution, relying on a non-
cooperative game-theoretic formulation, has been proposed to reduce the communication time for fully
connected D2D networks, i.e., single-hop D2D networks. In this paper, we develop a distributed game-
theoretical solution to reduce the communication time for a more realistic scenario of a decentralized and
partially connected, i.e., multi-hop, IDNC-enabled D2D network. The problem is modeled as a coalition
game with cooperative-players wherein the payoff function is derived so that decreasing individual payoff
results in the desired cooperative behavior. Given the intractability of the formulation, the coalition
game is relaxed to a coalition formation game (CFG) involving the formation of disjoint coalitions.
A distributed algorithm relying on merge-and-split rules is designed for solving the relaxed problem.
The effectiveness of the proposed solution is validated through extensive numerical comparisons against
existing methods in the literature.
Index Terms
Coalition game, device-to-device networks, instantly decodable network coding, multimedia stream-
ing, real-time applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE use of smartphones and data-hungry applications in radio access networks are in-creasing dramatically worldwide. This growth impacts the ability of traditional wireless
networks to meet the required Quality-of-Service (QoS) for its users. Device-to-device (D2D)
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communication has been proposed as a candidate technology [1], [2] to support a massive number
of connected devices and possibly improve the data rate of the next-generation mobile networks
[3], [4]. The decentralized nature of D2D networks allows devices to communicate with other
nearby devices over short-range and possibly more reliable links which is suitable for numerous
applications in mobile networks. For example, in wireless cellular networks, D2D system enables
mobile traffic offloading by user cooperations for content downloading and sharing. Using
conventional centralized Point-to-Multi-Point (PMP) networks, e.g., cellular, Wi-Fi, and fog/cloud
radio access networks (FRAN/CRAN), for content delivery would be excessively complicated
and expensive.
Wireless channels are prone to interference and fading which result in packet/data loss at the
application level. A widely used algorithm for packet recovery problem is the Automatic Repeat
reQuest (ARQ). However, this simple algorithm is highly inefficient for broadcast applications.
For example, consider that a base-station (BS) is required to deliver the set of packets {p1, p2, p3}
to users {u1, u2, u3}. Assume that after sequentially transmitting {p1, p2, p3}, user ui is still
missing packet pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. To complete the reception of all packets for all users, the BS
needs at least 3 uncoded transmissions. However, by using an erasure code, the BS can broadcast
the binary XOR combination p1 ⊕ p2 ⊕ p3 that requires a single transmission.
Different erasure codes have been proposed for various applications and diverse network
settings to solve the packet recovery problem. For the aforementioned PMP wireless broadcast
networks, Raptor codes [5], and Random Linear Network Codes (RLNC) [6] achieve maximum
network throughput. Despite being efficient and offering a low-complexity solution, Raptor codes
and RLNC are not attractive techniques for real-time applications, such as video streaming, online
gaming, and teleconferencing. These codes accumulate a substantial decoding delay, meaning that
these codes do not allow progressive decoding. In particular, coded packets cannot be decoded
to retrieve the original data until a large number of independent transmissions are received.
Instantly Decodable Network Coding (IDNC) has been proposed as a low-complexity solution
to improve throughput while allowing progressive decoding of the received packets [7]. By
relying solely on binary XOR operations, IDNC ensures fast and instantaneous decodability of
the transmitted packets for their intended users. Therefore, IDNC has been the topic of extensive
research, e.g., [8]–[12]. It has been applied in several real-time broadcast applications wherein
received packets need to be used at the application layer immediately to maintain a high QoS,
e.g., relay-aided networks [13], [14] video-on-demand and multimedia streaming [15]–[18], and
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D2D-enabled systems [19]–[22]. The potential of IDNC technique is manifold [23].
All the aforementioned IDNC works, for both PMP and D2D networks, are centralized in a
sense that they require a global coordinator, i.e., a BS or a cloud, to plan packet combinations
and coordinate transmissions. For example, the authors of [22] considered the completion time
minimization problem in a partially connected D2D FRANs. The problem is solved under the
assumption that the fog is within the transmission range of all devices and has perfect knowledge
of the network topology. The authors suggested that the fog selects transmitting devices and their
optimal packet combinations and conveys the information to the users for execution.
While the aforementioned centralized approaches provide a good performance for the de-
centralized system, it comes at a high computation cost at the cloud/fog units and high power
consumption at each user. Indeed, users need to send the status of all D2D channels to the central
controller at each time slot. In addition, the cloud controller requires to know the downloading
history of users for content delivery. Recently, the authors in [24], [25] proposed a distributed
solution for D2D networks that rely on a non-cooperative game-theoretic formulation. However,
in such game models, each player makes its decisions individually and selfishly. Furthermore,
the system is assumed to be fully connected, i.e., single-hop, which only selects one player to
transmit at any time instance. The fully connected model is not only an idealist in which all
players are connected, it also causes severe latency (delay) in the network. Our work proposes
a fully distributed solution for completion time minimization in a partially connected D2D
network using coalition games [26]. Thus, multiple and altruistic players transmit IDNC packets
simultaneously.
Due to the cooperative and altruistic decisions among players, coalition games have been
used in different network settings to optimize different parameters [27]–[31]. For example, the
tutorial in [27] classified the coalition games and demonstrated the applications of coalition
games in communication networks. The authors of [28] proposed a distributed game theoretical
scheme for users’ cooperation in wireless networks to maximize users’ rate while accounting
the cost of cooperation. The authors of [30] proposed a Bayesian coalitional game for coalition-
based cooperative packet delivery. Recently, the authors of [31] suggested a constrained coalition
formation game for minimizing users’ content uploading in D2D multi-hop networks. For packet
recovery purpose, we employ coalition game and IDNC optimization in D2D multi-hop networks.
Our work considers D2D multi-hop networks comprising several single-interface devices
distributed in a geographical area, and each device is partially connected to other devices. The
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packet recovery problem is motivated by real-time applications that tolerate only low delays, i.e.,
multimedia streaming. In such applications, users’ devices need to immediately exchange a set
of packets, represented by a frame, between them with the minimum communication time. Our
proposed model appears in different applications. For example, in current LTE system, where
users at the edge of the service area or in dense urban areas often experience high degradation in
the quality of signal from data centers due to channel impairments. Our proposed D2D distributed
scheme would improve the total communication time of such users by implementing short and
reliable D2D communications. Moreover, in cell centers with low erasures, our proposed scheme
would offload the cloud’s resources, e.g., time, bandwidth, and the ability to serve more users.
Motivated by the aforementioned discussions, our work solves the completion time reduction
problem in partially connected D2D networks. To this end, we introduce a novel coalition game
framework capturing the complex interplays of instantly decodable network coding, transmitting
user-receiving user associations, and a limited coverage zone of each user. The main contributions
of this work can be summarized as follows.
1) We formulate the completion time minimization problem in partially connected D2D net-
works and model it as a coalition game. We further demonstrate the difficulty of expressing
the problem as a coalition game with non-transfer function (NTU) which motivates its
relaxation to a coalition formation game (CFG).
2) We derive the rules for assigning players1, selecting transmitting player, and finding optimal
encoded IDNC packets for each disjoint altruistic coalition.
3) We propose a distributed algorithm based on merge-and-split rules and study its convergence
analysis, stability, complexity, and communication overhead.
4) We validate our theoretical finding using numerical simulations. Our numerical results reveal
that our distributed scheme can significantly outperform existing centralized PMP and fully
distributed methods. Indeed, for presented network setups, our coalition formation game
offers almost the same performance as the centralized FRAN scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and
formulates the completion time minimization problem. Afterward, the problem is modeled as a
coalition game and relaxed to a coalition formation game in Section III. The proposed distributed
algorithm can be found in Section IV, and its convergence analysis, stability, complexity, and
1Player and device are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
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communication overhead are provided in Section V. Section VI numerically tests the performance
of the proposed method against existing schemes, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The considered network and IDNC models are introduced in Section II-A and Section II-B,
respectively. The fully distributed completion time reduction problem in the considered network
is formulated in Section II-C. Section II-D further shows through a simple example that the
completion time problem is generally intractable, which motivates the coalition game formulation
in Section III.
A. Network Model and Parameters
Consider a D2D-enabled wireless network consisting of N users denoted by the set U =
{u1, u2, · · · , uN}. These users are interested in receiving a frame P = {p1, p2, · · · , pM} of M
packets. The size of the frame P depends on the size of the packet and size of content. Due
to previous initial transmissions, from data centers or access points, each device holds a part of
the frame P . The side information of the u-th device is represented by the following sets.
• The Has set Hu: Successfully received packets.
• The Wants set Wu = P \ Hu: Erased/lost packets.
The side information of all players can be summarized in a binary N × M state matrix
S = [sup] wherein the entry sup = 0 states that packet p is successfully received by player u
and 1 otherwise. In order for all users to obtain the whole frame P from D2D communications,
we assume that each packet pi, 1 ≤ i ≤M is received by at least one user. In other words, the
sum of the rows
∑
u∈U sup ≥ 1 for all packets p ∈ P .
We consider a realistic multi-hop network topology. In such networks, battery-powered devices
can only target the subset of devices in their coverage zone, denoted here by Cu of the u-th
player. The network topology can be captured by a unit diagonal symmetric N ×N adjacency
matrix C represents the connectivity of the players such that Cuu′ = 1 if and only if u′ ∈ Cu.
We assume that no part of the network is disjoint, i.e., the matrix C is connected. Otherwise,
the proposed algorithm is separately applied to each independent part of the network. Upon
successful reception of a packet, each player send an error-free acknowledgment (ACK) to all
players in its coverage zone to update their side information matrix.
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We focus only on upper layer view of the network, where network coding scheme is performed
at the network-layer and the physical-layer is abstracted by a memory-less erasure channel. This
abstraction is widely used in network coding literature, where a packet is either perfectly received
or completely lost with certain average probability [8], [10], [19], [21]–[25], [32]. Therefore, the
physical channel between players u and u′ is modeled by a Bernoulli random variable whose
mean σuu′ indicates the packet erasure probability from player u to player u′. We assume that
these probabilities remain constant during the transmission of a single packet pi ∈ P and they
are known to all devices. However, due to the channel’s asymmetry and the difference in the
transmit powers of both devices u and u′, the equality of σuu′ and σu′u is not guaranteed.
We consider a slowly changing network topology, in which players have fixed locations
during the IDNC packet transmission and change from one transmission to another transmission.
However, after one transmission, the devices can move and all the network variables will be
updated, and our model, i.e., the coalition formation solution, can be used with updated network
parameters. It is important to note that in single-hop networks, each player is connected to
all other players in the network, and hence, it precisely knows the side information of all other
players. To avoid any collision in the network, only one player is allowed to transmit an encoded
packet in one hop at any time slot. Clearly, this causes severe latency, i.e., delay, in delivering
packets to all players. In multi-hop networks, multiple players are allowed to transmit encoded
packets simultaneously. This results in targeting many players, and thus makes the delivery of
packets to the players faster.
B. Instantly Decodable Network Coding Model
IDNC encodes packets through binary XOR operations. Let κ ⊂ P be an XOR combination
of some packets in P . The transmission of the combination κ is beneficial to the u-th user,
in a sense that it allows the u-th user to retrieve one of its missing packets, if and only if the
combination contains a single packet fromWu. In that case, the user u can XOR the combination
κ with κ ∩ Hu to obtain its missing packet. Hence, we say that the user u is targeted by the
transmission κ.
Let A(t) ⊂ U denote the set of transmitting players at the t-th transmission and κ(t)(A) =
(κ1, · · · , κ|A(t)|) denote the packet combinations to be sent by users in A(t). For notation
simplicity, the time index t is often omitted when it is clear from the context. Similar to
[21], [22], [24], [25], we consider players use the same frequency band and transmit encoded
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packets simultaneously. Thus, players located in the intersection of the coverage zone of multiple
transmitting players experience collision at the network layer and no packets can be decoded.
Considering the interference of transmissions caused by other players to the set of transmitting
players in partially connected D2D networks can be pursued in a future work. Therefore, player u′
is targeted by the transmission from the u-th player if and only if it can receive the transmission
and the packet combination contains a single file from Wu′ . Let τ(κ(A)) = (τ1, · · · , τ|A|)
denote the set of targeted players by the transmitting players wherein u′ ∈ τu(κ(A)) implies that
|Wu′ ∩ κu(A)| = 1 and {u′} ∩ Cu ∩ Cu′′ = δuu′′{u′} for all transmitting players u′′ ∈ A wherein
δuu′′ is the Kronecker symbol.
Definition 1. The individual completion time Tu of the u-th player is the number of transmissions
required until it gets all packets in P . The overall completion time T = maxu∈U{Tu} represents
the time required until all the players get all the packets.
We use IDNC to minimize the completion time required to complete the reception of all
packets for all users in the partially connected D2D network. Given that the direct minimization
of the completion time is intractable [23], we follow [12] in reducing the completion time by
controlling the decoding delay.
Definition 2. The decoding delay Du of player u increases by one unit if and only if the player
still wants packets, i.e., Wi 6= ∅, and receives a combination that does not allow it to reduce
the size of its Wants set. The decoding delay D is the sum of all individual delays.
C. Completion Time Minimization Problem Formulation
In this subsection, we formulate the distributed completion time reduction problem in IDNC-
enabled D2D network. Let N be a binary vector of size N whose u-th index is 1 if player u has
non-empty Wants set, i.e., Wu 6= ∅ and 0 otherwise, and let τ(κ(A)) = 1− τ(κ(A)) be the set
of the non-targeted players by the encoded packets κ(A). The different erasure occurrences at
the t-th time slot are denoted by ω : Z+ → {0, 1}N×N with ω(t) = [Yuu′ ], for all (u, u′) ∈ U2,
where Yuu′ is a Bernoulli random variable equal to 0 with probability σuu′ .
Let at = (a
[1]
t , a
[2]
t , · · · , a[N ]t ) be a binary vector of length N whose a[u]t -th element is equal
to 1 if player u is transmitting, i.e., ‖a‖1 = |A|. Likewise, let D(at) be the decoding delay
experienced by all players in the t-th recovery round. In particular, D(at) is a metric quantifies
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the ability of the transmitting players to generate innovative packets for all the targeted players.
This metric increases by one unit for each player that still wants packets and successfully receives
a nonuseful transmission from any transmitting player in A or for a transmitting player that still
wants some packets. Let I = (I [1], I [2], · · · , I [N ]) be a binary vector of size N whose I [u]
entry is 1 if player u is hearing more than one transmission from the set A, i.e., u ∈ Cu′ ∩ Cu′′
where u′ 6= u′′ ∈ A and 0 otherwise, and let O = (O[1],O[2], · · · , O[N ]) be a binary vector of
size N whose O[u] element is 1 if player u is out of transmission range of any player in A, i.e.,
u /∈ Cu′ , ∀ u′ ∈ A and 0 otherwise.
Given the above configurations, the overall decoding delays D(at) experienced by all players,
since the beginning of the recovery phase until the t-th transmission, can be expressed as follows.
D(at) = D(t− 1) +
N if ‖at‖1 = 0I +O + at +D(at) otherwise. (1)
As mentioned, the completion time is a difficult and intractable metric to optimize. However,
in network coding literature, such metric is approximated by the anticipated completion time
which can be computed at each time instant using the decoding delay. Using the decoding delay
in (1), the anticipated completion time is defined as follows.
Definition 3. The anticipated individual completion time of the u-th player is defined by the
following expression
Tu(at) =
|W(0)u |+ Du(at)− E[σu]
1− E[σu] , (2)
where |W(0)u | is the Wants set of player u at the beginning of the recovery phase and E[σu] is
the expected erasure probability linking player u to the other players.
Clearly, (2) represents the number of transmissions that are required to complete the trans-
mission of all requested packets in P . In this context, completion time is intimately related
to the throughput of the system. Throughput is measured as the number of cooperative D2D
transmission rounds required by the players to download all their requested packets.
The overall anticipated completion time can be written as T (at) = max
u
(Tu(at)) = ‖T (at)‖∞.
Therefore, the anticipated completion time minimization problem at the t-th transmission in
IDNC-enabled D2D multi-hop network can be written as follows.
min
at∈{0,1}N
κ(A)∈{0,1}M
‖T (at)‖∞. (3)
8
Unlike single-hop model that requires only an optimization over a single transmitting player
and its corresponding packet combination, a multi-hop model needs to select the set of trans-
mitting players A and the optimal encoded packets κ(A). As such, the probability of increasing
the anticipated completion time is minimized.
D. Example of IDNC Transmissions in a Partially Connected D2D-enabled Network
This section illustrates the aforementioned definitions and concepts with a simple example.
Consider a simple partially connected D2D network containing 6 players and a frame P =
{p1, p2, p3, p4} as illustrated in Fig. 1. The side information of all players is given on the left
part of Fig. 1, and the coverage zone of each player is represented by edges. For ease of analysis,
we assume error-free transmissions.
Assume that u1 transmits the encoded packet κ1 = p3 ⊕ p4 to players u2, u3, u5, and let u6
transmit κ6 = p1 ⊕ p4 to players u4, u5 in the first time slot. Then, in the second time slot, u4
transmits κ4 = p2 to u6, and u1 transmits κ1 = p2 ⊕ p4 to players u2, u5. The decoding delay
experienced by the different players is given as follows.
• Player u5 experiences one unit delay as it is in the intersection of the coverage zone of u1
and u6. In other words, u5 is in collision, i.e., u5 ∈ I. Thus, player u5 would not be able
to decode packet κ6 transmitted by player u6.
• Player u6 experiences one unit of delay as it is transmitting in the first time slot.
Under this scenario, we have the following assumption.
• First time slot: N = (0 1 1 1 1 1), the set of transmitting players A(1) = {u1, u6} =
a1 = (1 0 0 0 0 1), the corresponding encoded packets κ(A(1)) = (κ1, κ6), and the set of
targeted players τ(κ(A(1))) = (τ1, τ6) = {(u2, u3), (u4)}. The set of players that hearing
more than one transmission I = (0 0 0 0 1 0), and the set of players that out of transmission
range of any player in A(1) is O = 0. The decoding delay experienced by all players is
D(a1) = (0 0 0 0 1 1). The accumulative decoding delay is D(a1) = (0 0 0 0 1 1).
• Second time slot: N = (0 1 0 0 1 1), the set of transmitting players A(2) = {u1, u4} =
a1 = (1 0 0 1 0 0), the corresponding encoded packets κ(A(2)) = (κ1, κ4), and the set of
targeted players τ(κ(A(2))) = (τ1, τ4) = {(u2, u5), (u6)}. The set of players hearing more
than one transmission I = 0, and the set of players that out of transmission range of any
player in A(1) is O = 0. The decoding delay is D(a2) = 0 and the accumulative decoding
delay D(a2) = (0 0 0 0 1 1).
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A = {u1, u6} A = {u1, u4}
p1
Fig. 1. A partially connected D2D network containing 6 players and 4 packets.
• The individual completion time of all players after the second transmission is
T = (0 2 1 1 2 2). Thus, the maximum completion time is 2 time slots which represents
the overall completion time for all players to get their requested packets, i.e., N = 0.
III. DISTRIBUTED COMPLETION TIME MINIMIZATION AS A COALITION GAME
This section models the completion time problem in IDNC-enabled D2D multi-hop networks
using coalition games [26]. Afterward, fundamental concepts in coalition games are defined
and provided. These concepts are used in Section IV to derive the distributed completion time
reduction solution in a partially connected D2D network.
A. Completion Time Minimization as a Coalition Game
To mathematically model the aforementioned completion time problem, we use coalition game
theory. In particular, the problem is modeled as a coalition game with a non-transferable utility
(NTU) [26].
Definition 4. A coalition game with a non-transferable utility is defined as a pair (U , φ), where
U is the set of players consisting of N devices and φ is a real function such that for every
coalition Ss ⊆ U , φ(Ss) is the payoff that coalition Ss receives which cannot be arbitrarily
apportioned between its players.
For the problem of cooperative D2D completion time among players, given any coalition
Ss ⊆ U , we define φ(Ss) = (φ1(Ss), · · · , φ|S|(Ss)) as the tuple wherein element φu(Ss)
represents the payoff of player u in coalition Ss. Lets |Ss| represents the total number of players
in Ss. The |S|-dimensional vector represents the family of real vector payoffs of coalition Ss,
which is denoted by φ(Ss). As previously mentioned, for each coalition, we need to determine
the transmitting player and its IDNC packet selection in order to minimize the increasing of the
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completion time. Consequently, by adopting the cooperative D2D completion model described
in the previous section, the total payoff of any coalition Ss ⊆ U , ∀s = {1, · · · , k} is given by
φ(Ss) = max
u
(φu(Ss)) = ‖φ(Ss)‖∞, (4)
where φu(S) is the payoff of player u which is in our problem given by
φu(Ss) = −‖Tu(at)‖∞ − ‖Du(at)− Du(at−1)‖1. (5)
The payoff function in (4) represents the total payoff that a coalition receives due to self-
organize players. For a player u ∈ Ss, the first term in (5) represents the maximum anticipated
completion time among players in Ss that is defined in (2). Similarly, the second term in (5)
represents the augmentation of the sum decoding delay that is defined in (1). Therefore, players
in coalitions prefer to increase the payoff in (5) by minimizing the anticipated completion time
through controlling the decoding delay.
Property 1. The proposed D2D completion time cooperative problem is modeled as a coalition
game with NTU (U , φ) where U is the set of players and φ is the payoff function given by (4).
Proof: From the nature of definition 1 and definition 2, each player u has its own unique
anticipated completion time and decoding delay, and, thus, it has a unique payoff φu(Ss) within
a coalition Ss. Therefore, the payoff function in (4) cannot be arbitrarily apportioned between
coalition’s players. Thus (4) is considered as an NTU. Further, the overall completion time is
the maximum individual completion times of the players regardless of the coalition. In other
words, the dependency of φ(Ss) in any coalition structure is not only on packet recovery of
players inside Ss, but also on packet recovery outside Ss, which concludes that the proposed
game model is NTU game.
Although cooperation generally reduces the payoffs of players [26], it is limited by inherent
information exchange cost that needs to be paid by the players when acting cooperatively.
Consequently, for any coalition Ss ⊆ U , players need to exchange information for cooperation,
which is an increasing function of the coalition size. The problem becomes severe when all
players are in the same coalition, i.e., grand coalition (GC). However, given the realistic scenario
of a partially connected network where each device has limited coverage, it is highly likely that
when attempting to form the GC, one of these scenarios would hold: 1) there exist a pair of
players u, u′ ∈ U that are distant enough to receive packets from the set A, thus they have
no incentive to join the grand coalition, and 2) there exists a player u ∈ U with a payoff in
11
GC φu(U(t)) that is greater than its payoff in any coalition φu(Ss). Hence, this player has an
incentive to deviate from the GC.
Since we consider partially connected D2D networks, players would most likely form coali-
tions with their neighbors based on their preferences, which results in forming small coalitions’
sizes, not large coalitions’ sizes. In other words, the GC of all the players is seldom formed.
Therefore, the cost due to small coalition formations would not have a significant impact on the
payoff functions. Subsequently, the proposed (U , φ) game is classified as a coalition formation
game (CFG) [27], where players form several independent disjoint coalitions. Hence, classical
solution concepts for coalition games, such as the core [26], may not be applicable for our
problem. In brief, the proposed coalition game (U , φ) is a CFG, where the objective is to offer
an algorithm for forming coalitions.
B. Coalition Formation Concepts
This section recalls the fundamental concepts of coalition formation games that are used in
the next section. CFG, a subclass of coalition games, has been a topic of high interest in game
theory research [27], [28], [31]. The fundamental approach in coalition formation games is to
allow players in the formation set to join or leave a coalition based on a well-defined and most
suitable preference for NTU games, i.e., Pareto Order. Pareto Order is the basis of many existing
coalition formation concepts, e.g., the merge-and-split algorithm [29].
Definition 5. A coalition structure, denoted as Ψ, is defined as Ψ = {S1, · · · ,Sk} for 1 <
|Sk| < |U| independent disjoint coalitions Sk of Ψ.
One can see from definition 5 that different coalition structures may lead to different system
payoffs as each coalition structure Ψ has its unique payoff φ(Ψ). These differences in Ψ and
their corresponding payoffs φ(Ψ) are usually ordered through a comparison relationship. In the
coalition game literature, e.g., [29], comparison relationships based on orders are divided into
individual value orders and coalition value orders. Individual order implies that comparison is
performed based on the players’ payoffs. This is referred to as the Pareto Order. In particular,
in such order, no player is willing to move to another coalition when at least one of the players
in that coalition is worse off. In other words, the payoff of players would be worse off after the
new player joins. This is known as selfish behavior. Coalition order implies that two coalition
structures are compared based on the payoff of the coalitions in these coalition structures. This
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is known as a utilitarian order and is denoted by .. In other words, the notation Ψ2 .Ψ1 means
that φ(Ψ1) > φ(Ψ2). Subsequently, the definition of the preference operator that considered in
this paper is given as follows.
Definition 6. A preference operator . is defined for comparing two coalition structures Ψ1 =
{S1, · · · ,Sk} and Ψ2 = {R1, · · · ,Rm} that are partitions of the same set of players U . The
notation Ψ2 .Ψ1 denotes that players in U are preferred to be in Ψ2 than Ψ1.
IV. PROPOSED FULLY DISTRIBUTED SOLUTION
This section derives the constraints of forming a coalition. These constraints represent the
optimal players’ associations, the transmitting player, and its optimal IDNC packet in a coalition.
By the given constraints, our aim is to propose a distributed coalition formation algorithm relying
on merge-and-split rules [29].
A. Coalition Formation Constraints
Let Us be the set of all associated players in coalition Ss and Ns the subset of Us that have
non-empty Wants set. Let Ms be the subset of packets that in the Has set of each player in Us,
which defined as Ms =
⋃
u∈UsHu. Let Ss denote the set of all neighbor coalitions to coalition
Ss. For a coalition Ss, the transmitting device a∗s is the one that can achieve the least expected
increase in the completion time. According to the analysis available in [24], [25], a transmitting
device a∗s and its packet combination κa∗s can be obtained by solving the following problem
a∗s = arg max
a∈As\Ls
|Ca ∩Ns|+ max
κa∈κ(As)
∑
u∈Ls∩τ(κa)
log
1
σau
, (6)
where As is the set of players in coalition Ss that are not in any coverage zone of all other
players in Ss and Ls(t) is the set of critical players that can potentially increase the overall
payoff of the coalition Ss before the t-th transmission. This set characterizes the players based
on their anticiapted completion times to give them priority to be targeted in the next transmission.
In other words, Ls(t) contains players that would potentially increase the maximum anticipated
completion time if they are not targeted in the next transmission. It can be define mathematically
as
Ls(t) =
{
u ∈ U ∩ Ns
∣∣Tu(at − 1) + 11− E[σu] > ‖T (at − 1)‖∞
}
. (7)
The set of targeted players in coalition Ss when device a∗s transmits the combination κa∗s is
τ(κa∗s) =
{
u ∈ Ss
∣∣|κa∗s ∩Wu| = 1 and Ca∗su = 1} . (8)
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With the aforementioned variable definitions, we can reformulate the completion time minimiza-
tion problem in IDNC-based partially connected D2D network per coalition at each time instance
as follows
min
at∈{0,1}|Us|
κ∈{0,1}|Ms|
φ(Ss) (9a)
s. t. |τ(κa∗s)| > 1, (9b)
τ(κa∗s) ∩ τ(κa∗s′ ) = ∅,∀ a
∗
s 6= a∗s′ ∈ Ss. (9c)
Constraint (9b) says that the number of targeted players in each coalition must be more than
one to ensure that at each transmission at least a player is benefiting. Constraint (9c) states that
all targeted players should not experience any collision.
To find the optimal solution to the problem in (9), we need to search over all the sets of
optimal player-coalition associations, their different erasure patterns, players’ actions and their
optimal IDNC packets in one coalition. As pointed out in [22] for centralized fog system, this
is a challenging problem. Further, the solution to (9) must go through the players’ decisions to
join/leave a coalition at each stage of the game. To seek a desirable solution to (9) that is capable
of achieving significant completion time reduction, we propose to use a distributed algorithm
relying on merge-and-split rules.
B. A Distributed Coalition Formation Algorithm
This section presents a distributed coalition forming algorithm to obtain the minimum com-
pletion time of players. The key mechanism is to allow players in coalition formation process
to make individual decisions for selecting potential neighbor coalitions at any game stage. We
first define two rules of merge-and-split that allow the modification of Ψ of the set U players as
follows.
Definition 7. (Merge Operation). Any set of coalitions {S1, · · · ,Sk} in Ψ1 can be merged if
and only if (
k⋃
i=1
Si,Ψ2) . ({S1, · · · ,Sk},Ψ1), where
k⋃
i=1
Si and Ψ2 are the new set of coalitions
and the new coalition structure after the merge operation, respectively.
Definition 8. (Split Operation). Any set of coalitions
k⋃
i=1
Si in Ψ1 can be split if and only if
({S1, · · · ,Sk},Ψ2). (
k⋃
i=1
Si,Ψ1), where {S1, · · · ,Sk} and Ψ2 are the new set of coalitions and
the new coalition structure after the split operation, respectively.
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The merge rule means that two coalitions merge if their merger would benefit not only the
players in the merged coalition but also benefit the overall coalition structure value, i.e., the
overall completion time. On the other hand, a coalition split into smaller ones if its splitter
coalitions enhance at least the payoff of one player in that coalition. Therefore, using these
two known rules, we present a distributed algorithm to solve the completion time minimization
problem in (3). The proposed algorithm is broken into three steps as follows.
First, in Ψini, players need to discover their neighbors by utilizing one of different known
neighbor discovery schemes, e.g., those used in wireless networks [34]. For example, each
player broadcasts a message consisting of two segments; each segment consists of one byte.
While the first byte indicates the number of players in each player’s coverage zone, the second
byte indicates the completion time of that player. Further, players collect all aforementioned
information, and the one who is connected to a large number of players, has a large Has set, and
not in the coverage zone of any player in any other coalitions. However, if such player does not
exist, the size of the coalition is increased until that player exists. To summarize, a transmitting
player a∗s in coalition s should satisfy (9b) and (9c) and can be obtained by solving problem (6).
Afterward, each player evaluates its potential payoff as in (5) to make an accurate decision as
explained in step II. The selected transmitting player in each coalition is referred to a coalition
head who can do the analysis in step II. Therefore, this step significantly reduces the search
space of the coalition formation.
The coalition formation step optimizes the selection of the transmitting players and their IDNC
packets through many successive split-and-merge rules between coalitions. Therefore, step II is
to assign players to potential neighbor coalitions, select the transmitting player, and find its
optimal IDNC packet, which can be accomplished by the following. In this step, the time-index
is updated to τ = τ + 1. The merge rules are implemented by checking the merging possibilities
of each pair of neighbor coalitions s and k. Particularly, a coalition s ∈ Ψτ can decide to merge
with another coalition k to form a new coalition j. As such, the resulting structure guarantees
both merge conditions (MC).
• MC1: There exists at least one player satisfies (9b) and (9c).
• MC2: At least one player in the merged coalition can reduce its individual payoff without
increasing the payoffs of the other players.
After all the coalitions have made their merge decisions based on the players preferences, the
merge rules end. This results in the updated coalition structure Ψτ . Similarly, the split rules
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Fig. 2. A resulting coalition structure Ψfin = {S1,S2} from Algorithm 1 for a partially connected D2D network that is presented
in Fig. 1.
performed on the players that do not benefit from being a member of that coalition. In other
terms, coalition s ∈ Ψτ can be splitted into coalitions of smaller sizes as long as the splitter
coalitions guarantee both split conditions (SC).
• SC1: At least one player can strictly enhance its payoff without increasing the payoffs of
all the remaining players.
• SC2: In each split coalition, there exists at least one player satisfying (9b) and (9c).
At the end of the split rules, the coalition structure Ψ1 is updated. The time index is updated
along with a sequence of merge-and-split rules which take place in a distributed manner. Such
sequence continues based on the resulting payoff of each player and coalition. It ends when
there is no further merge-and-split rules required in the current coalition structure Ψτ , which is
the case of the final coalition structure Ψfin.
Finally, each transmitting player in each coalition broadcasts an IDNC packet to all players in
its coverage zone. The distributed merge-and-split coalition formation algorithm is summarized
in Algorithm 1. We repeat the above three steps until all packets are disseminated among players,
as explained in Algorithm 2.
Fig. 2 depicts a snapshot of the coalition structure Ψfin= {S1,S2} resulting from Algorithm 1
for the simple D2D network presented in Fig. 1. For ease of analysis, we assume error-free
transmissions. Given the coverage zone of each player and their side information as in Fig. 1,
two disjoint coalitions are formed where only one player transmits in each coalition. In particular,
in coalition S1, player u4 transmits packet p1 to player u6, and in coalition S2, player u1 transmits
an IDNC packet p3⊕p4 to players u2, u3, u5. The transmitting player in each coalition is shown
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Algorithm 1: Coalition Formation Distributed Algorithm for a D2D Multi-hop Network
Initialization:
Players are organized themselves into an initial coalition structure Ψini = {S1, · · · ,Sk};
Initialize time-index τ = 0 and Ψτ = Ψini;
Step I: Coalition Members Discovery;
• Each player discovers its neighboring players.
for each Ss ∈ Ψini,∀s = {1, 2, · · · , k} do
Select the transmitting players As that satisfying (9b) and (9c) and find a∗s and its
IDNC packet κa∗s by solving (6).
Calculate the utility of each player as in (5).
end for
Step II: Coalition Formation;
• The optimization target in coalition Ss is min
at∈{0,1}|Us|
κ∈{0,1}|Ms|
φ(Ss).
• Obtain player’s assignments based on the two main rules of merge and split:
repeat
Update τ = τ + 1.
for each Ss ∈ Ψτ−1,∀s = {1, 2, · · · , k} do
The selected transmitting player analyzes all possible merge rules.
If a merge occurs, the current coalition structure Ψτ−1 is updated.
Update As and update the selected transmitting player by solving (6).
Set Ψτ = Ψτ−1.
end for
for each Ss ∈ Ψτ ,∀s = {1, 2, · · · , k} do
The selected transmitting player analyzes all possible split rules.
If a split occurs, the current coalition structure Ψτ is updated.
Update As and update the selected transmitting player by solving (6).
end for
until No further merge nor split rules
Output The convergence coalition structure Ψfin = Ψτ .
Step III: IDNC Packet Transmission;
• Each transmitting player a∗s in each coalition broadcasts IDNC packet κa∗s to all players in
its coverage zone.
in a red circle; their targeted players and the optimal IDNC packets are shown in Fig. 2. In a
nutshell, we shed some remarks on executing Algorithm 1.
• The merge-and-split rules enumerate only the neighbor coalitions, and this does not neces-
sarily need significant computations. To further reduce the computations, the players of a
coalition Ss can avoid merging with other neighbor coalition Sk if the payoffs of the players
in both coalitions are equal φu(Ss) = φu′(Sk), ∀u ∈ Ss and ∀u′ ∈ Sk.
• Forming coalitions only one time, i.e., at the first stage of the game, is not guaranteed to
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Algorithm 2: Overall D2D Multi-hop Approach for Solving Problem (3)
Data: U , P , Hu, Wu, Cu, Tu = 0, Du = 0, ∀ u ∈ U and .
Set time-index of the completion time t = 0;
Repeat:
• Execute Algorithm 1 and obtain the IDNC packet for each transmitting player in Ψfin;
• Each targeted player does an XOR binary operation and calculate the anticipated
completion time as in (2).
• Each targeted player broadcasts a one bit ACK, indicating the successful reception of the
packet, to all players in its coverage zone.
• t = t+ 1;
Until all packets are disseminated among players.
Output the completion time t.
disseminate all packets to all players. This is because each formed coalition has only some
portion of packets and does not have the wanted packets of other players in other coalitions.
For packet recovery completion, each coalition is formed, at each transmission round, based
on the individual preference of its members and irrespective of the Has sets of its members.
Thus, each transmitting player has disseminated some packets to each visited coalition in
previous transmissions.
In the considered game, each player has two actions to take either to transmit an IDNC
packet κ or to listen to a transmission. Therefore, the action of a player u at each game stage
t is ACu(t) = {transmit κu, remain silent}. The asymmetry of the side information at each
player generates a different packet combination to be sent by each player at each transmission
round. This causes the asymmetry of the action space of each player. Also, in each transmission,
different players are associated with each coalition. All these make the payoff of each coalition
unique.
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS, COMPLEXITY, AND COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
This section first studies the convergence of the coalition formation algorithm and its Nash
equilibrium stability. Afterward, the complexity properties of Algorithm 1 is analyzed, which
shows that Algorithm 1 needs a low signaling overhead.
A. Convergence and Nash Equilibrium
In coalition formation games, the stability of the coalition structures corresponds to an equi-
librium state known as Nash-equilibrium. This subsection proves that the convergence of the
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coalition formation algorithm is guaranteed and it is a Nash-stable coalition structure.
The following theorem demonstrates that Algorithm 1 terminates in a finite number of itera-
tions.
Theorem 1. Given any initial coalition structure Ψini, the coalition formation step of Algorithm 1
maps to a sequence of merge-and-split rules which converges, in a finite number of iterations,
to a final coalition structure Ψfin composed of a number of disjoint coalitions.
Proof. To proof this theorem, we need to show that for any merge or split rule, there exists a new
coalition structure which results from the coalition formation step of Algorithm 1. Starting from
any initial coalition structure Ψini, the coalition formation step of Algorithm 1 can be mapped
to a sequence of merge/split rules. As per definition 8 and definition 9, every merge or split rule
transforms the current coalition structure into another coalition structure, hence we obtain the
following sequence of coalition structures
Ψini → Ψ1 → Ψ2 → · · · Ψfin (10)
where Ψi+1 .Ψi, and → indicates the occurrence of a merge-and-split rule. Since the Pareto
Order introduced in definition 6 is irreflexive, transitive and monotonic, a coalition structure
cannot be revisited. Given the fact that the number of merge and split rules of a finite set is
finite and the merge/split operations-coalition structure mapping, the number of coalition structure
sequences in (10) is finite. Therefore, the sequence in (10) always terminates and converge to a
final coalition structure Ψfin. 
Definition 9. A coalition structure Ψ = {S1, · · · ,Sk} is Nash-stable if players have no incentive
to leave Ψ through merge-and-split operations.
This definition implies that any coalition structure Ψ is considered as a Nash-stable coalition
structure if and only if no player has an incentive to move from its current coalition and join
another coalition or make an individual decision by performing any merge/split rules. Further,
the coalitions in the final coalition structure Ψfin have no incentive to do more merge and split
operations. A Nash-stable coalition structure is also an individually stable coalition structure.
In general, in a coalition formation game, Nash-stability is a subset of individual stability [33].
Specifically, no player leaves its current coalition through a split rule and form an empty coalition,
i.e., no singleton coalition is formed if the following property holds.
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Property 2. There exists at least one coalition structure Ψ that satisfies both Nash-stability and
individual stability if and only if ∀Ss ∈ Ψ such that |Ss| > 1.
Proof: This property states that forming a singleton coalition cannot happen. Indeed, since
each player cannot send an encoded packet to itself, it believes that a better payoff can be
obtained by being a member of any coalition. Further, since the payoff of a non-targeted player
in any coalition and a single player-coalition is the same, our proposed algorithm, as mentioned
in the previous section, avoids making any merge-and-split rules for equal payoff values. Thus,
according to Algorithm 1, a Nash-stable and individual stable coalition structure can be obtained.
As a consequence of Property 2, the final coalition structure Ψfin that results from Algorithm 1
is Dhp stable as the coalitions have no incentive to do further merge-and-split operations. Dhp
stable is also known as merge-and-split proof [33]. Furthermore, Ψfin can be considered as Dc
stable. This is because players have no incentive to leave Ψfin and form any other coalitions [29].
To illustrate the above concepts, consider the resulting coalition structure Ψfin = {S1,S2} that
shown in Fig. 2. The coalition structure Ψfin is Nash-stable as no player has an incentive to leave
its current coalition. For example, player u5 has a payoff of φ5(S2) = −2 when being part of
the coalition S2 = {u1, u2, u3, u5}. The payoff φ5(S2) is calculated as follows. Since player u5
receives an IDNC encoded packet from player u1, it does not experience any decoding delay
increases. Thus, by (2), its anticipated completion time is T5(at) = |W
(0)
5 |+D5(at)−E[σ5]
1−E[σ5] = 2, and,
by (5) its payoff is −2. If player u5 switches to act non-cooperatively and joins S1, player u6
would be the new transmitting player in S1. In this case, player u5 will be in the coverage zone of
both transmitting players u1 in S2 and u6 in S1. Consequently, the payoff of player u5 decreases
to φ5(S1) = −3, and the payoff of player u6 decreases from φ6(S1) = −3 to φ6(S1) = −4.
Thus, player u5 does not deviate form its current coalition S2 and join S1. Similarly, if players
u2 and u3 act non-cooperatively by leaving S2 and forming a singleton coalition for each, i.e.,
S3 and S4, their payoffs decrease from φ2({2}) = −2 and φ2({3}) = −1 to φ2(S3) = −3 and
φ3(S4) = −2, respectively. Clearly, Ψfin is an individual Nash-stable as it does not have any
singleton coalition. Further, it is both Dhp and Dc stable as no further merge-and-split operations
can be performed by the coalitions and no player has incentive to deviate from Ψfin, respectively.
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B. Complexity Analysis and Communication Overhead
This section analyzes the computational complexity and communication burden of Algo-
rithm 1.
Computational Complexity: Each player at any game stage needs to find the optimal IDNC
packet combination, which depends on the packets that it possesses. Further, since a game
with incomplete information, i.e., each player knows only the side information of players in its
coverage zone, every player can generate the IDNC packet combinations of all other players
in its coverage zone. This allows every player to calculate the payoff function (5) of all other
players in its coverage zone.
The complexity of generating an optimal IDNC packet using a maximum weight search method
is explained as follows. First, the BS generates the vertcies of O(NM), and it connects them by
edges that represent network coding conditions of O(N2M). Then, the BS executes the maximum
weight search method that computes the weight of O(NM) vertcies, and selects maximum N
users. Hence, the overall complexity of finding the optimal IDNC packet is O(NM)+O(N2M)+
O(NM ∗ N) = O(N2M) [8]. In our case, the complexity is bounded by O(N2M) since the
number of players in the coverage zone of each player is less than the total number of players.
Communication Overhead: The communication overhead of Algorithm 1 is related to perform
the members’ discovery step, coalition heads selection, and the analysis of merge-and-split rules,
which is associated with the total number of coalition formations.
First, similar to many algorithms in the literature, e.g., [34], the member discovery step needs
|N | 2-byte messages, in which each message is being sent to all neighbor players which is
denoted by U. Thus, the total communication overhead for discovering the neighbor players is
|2NU| bytes.
Second, coalition head selection can be performed in many different strategies, e.g., based
on players’ attributes [35], [36]. In Algorithm 1, players in each coalition initially select their
coalition head by exchanging an advertisement message among them, and the one that satisfies
the conditions C1 and C2 in Section IV-B would be chosen. The same process is applied for
selecting/updating the coalition head in step III. Being a player connected to most players in the
coalition, the coalition head is responsible for ensuring that the rest of the coalition’s members
received an acknowledgment (ACK). As such, they can update their side information after each
D2D transmission.
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Third, the communication overhead of the coalition formation step is based on the number of
merge-and-split rules, which is mainly related to the total number of decisions made by each
of the N players. As previously mentioned, the merge-and-split operations enumerate only the
neighbor coalitions Ss. Thus, two extreme cases can occur.
• If all coalitions’ players decide to leave their current coalitions and join other coalitions.
In this case, each player u in coalition Ss would make |Ss| decisions (player u has an
|Ss| possibilities to join any of the neighbor coalitions). Consequently, the total number of
players’ decisions is Qworst = N |Ss|, and the overhead complexity is of the order O(N |Ss|).
• If players did not make any decisions. Since no decision is made by players, the overhead
in this case is only Qbest = N (due to the initial player-coalition associations as in step I),
and a complexity order of O(N).
In practical, the number of players’ decisions is between the above two cases, i.e., Qbest ≤ Q ≤
Qworst. Hence, if L average decisions are made by players, then Q = N |L| decisions that perform
split-and-merge rules are needed until Algorithm 1 converges.
Therefore, combining all the signaling overhead components, the total overhead is N(2U +
|L|). Such signaling overhead will add only a few bytes, which are negligible in size compared
to the entire packet’s size. Furthermore, to update the Has and Wants sets of players, only the
indices of packets needed for the communication between the players, not their contents. Hence,
we ignore signaling overhead factor because it is first constant (independent on the completion
time and decoding delay) and that its size is negligible.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed coalition formation game (denoted
by CFG partially-connected D2D) to demonstrate its capability of reducing the completion time
compare to the baseline schemes. We first introduce the simulation setup and the comparison
schemes. Then, the completion time and game performances are investigated, respectively.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider an IDNC-enabled partially connected D2D network where players are uniformly
re-positioned for each iteration in a 500m×500m cell with connectivity index C, which is
defined as the ratio of the average number of neighbors to the total number of players N .
A simple partially connected D2D network setting is plotted in Fig. 3 for the presented example
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in Fig. 1. The system setting in this paper follows the setup studied in [21], [22]. The initial
side information Hu and Wu, ∀u ∈ U of players is independently drawn based on their
average erasure probability. The short-range communications are more reliable than the BS-
player communications [19], [20]. Hence, unless specified, we assume that the player-to-player
erasure probability σ is half the BS-to-player erasure  in all simulations, i.e., σ = 0.5. Our
simulations were implemented using Matlab on a Windows 10 laptop 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7
processor and 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM. For the sake of comparison, we implement the
following schemes.
• The fully-connected D2D system in which a single user who has the largest number of
received packets transmits an IDNC packet at each round.
• The PMP system in which the BS is responsible for the transmissions. The BS holds all
the requested packets and can serve all the users. This scheme was proposed in [12].
• The one coalition formation game in a partially connected D2D (denoted by OCF partially-
connected D2D). In this scheme, only one coalition is formed, and a single player transmits
an IDNC packet at each round. The transmitting player is selected based on its number of
received packets as well as on the maximum number of players in its coverage zone.
• The partially D2D in FRANs (denoted by FRAN partially-connected D2D). In this scheme,
a fog central unit is responsible for determining the set of transmitting users and the packet
combinations. This scheme was proposed in [22].
B. Completion Time Performance Evaluation
To study the completion time performance of the proposed solution, we change the number
of players, packets, connectivity index, and the packet erasure probability.
In Fig. 4, we depict the average completion time as a function of the number of players
N for a network composed of M = 30 packets,  = 0.25, σ = 0.12, and connectivity index
C = 0.4. It is observed from Fig. 4 that the proposed CFG partially-connected D2D algorithm
outperforms the PMP, fully-connected D2D, and OCF partially-connected D2D schemes for all
simulated number of players. This is because of the simultaneous IDNC packet transmissions
from cooperating players at the same time. In particular, the fully-connected D2D system only
considers the size of the Has set as a metric to select a single player for transmission at each
round, i.e., a∗ = max
a∈U
Ha. The OCF partially-connected D2D scheme focuses on the maximum
number of connected players to be formed as well as on the size of the Has set of the transmitting
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Fig. 3. A partially connected D2D network of the example
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Fig. 6. Average completion time as a function of the average
player-player erasure probability σ.
player. On the other hand, although the transmitter in the PMP scheme can encode all the IDNC
combinations and target a certain number of players, the PMP scheme sacrifices the utility of the
simultaneous transmissions by considering only one transmission. Our proposed algorithm strikes
a balance between these aspects by jointly considering the number of targeted players and the Has
set size of each transmitting player. Despite the gain achieved by the FRAN partially-connected
D2D solution with the presence of a fog that executes the whole process, our decentralized
solution reaches the same performance. Clearly, due to the philosophy of the D2D simultaneous
transmissions that both schemes have proposed, their performances are roughly the same.
We observe from Fig. 4 that, for a small number of players, the PMP system is close to
both the CFG partially-connected D2D and FRAN partially-connected D2D schemes. This is
because, for a small number of players (N ≤ 60), the certainty that the whole frame M is
distributed between players in the initial transmissions is low, thus decreasing the probability of
exchanging potential IDNC packets between players. This makes the overall completion time
performance of the partial D2D scenarios close to the PMP scheme. As the number of players
increases (N ≥ 80), the bigger the certainty that the union of their Has sets is equal to M . This
results in more potential D2D IDNC packet exchange, thus increasing the gap between the PMP
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number of players N .
performance and both the FRAN partially-connected D2D and proposed schemes.
In Fig. 5, we illustrate the average completion time as a function of the number of packets M
for a network composed of N = 30 players,  = 0.25, σ = 0.12, and connectivity index C = 0.4.
The figure shows that the proposed scheme outperforms the fully connected, one coalition game,
and PMP schemes. For a few packets, the IDNC combinations are limited which affect the
ability of the proposed scheme to generate coded packets that satisfy number of players. With
increasing the number of packets, the number of transmissions needed for the completion for the
aforementioned schemes is remarkably increasing. Therefore, as the number of packets increases,
the proposed scheme outperforms largely the fully connected and one coalition game schemes.
We see from Fig. 4 that the completion time of all schemes linearly increases with the number
of packets. This is expected as the number of packets increases, a high number of transmissions
is required towards the completion. This results in increasing the average completion time.
In Fig. 6, we plot the average completion time as a function of the average player-player erasure
probability σ for a network composed of N = 60, M = 30,  = 2σ, and C = 0.4. Similar to what
we have discussed in the above figures, the average completion time of the partial D2D solutions
is noticeable compared to the fully-connected D2D and OCF partially-connected D2D schemes,
as shown in Fig. 6. We clearly see that the completion time of the partial D2D schemes is better
than the PMP one because of their multiple players’ transmissions at each round. Moreover,
as the player-to-player erasure probability increases, the BS-player erasure probability increases
two-fold ( = 2σ), thus slightly affecting the performance of the PMP scheme. The partial D2D
settings, however, benefit from short range and reliable communications which provide much
better players reachability and IDNC packet successful delivery compared to the PMP setting.
In Fig. 7, we investigate the average completion time as a function of the connectivity index C
for a network composed of N = 60, M = 30,  = 0.25, and σ = 0.12. It can clearly be seen that
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TABLE I
THE INFLUENCE OF CHANGING σ ON THE COMPLETION TIME PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Solution σ = 0.6 σ = 0.7 σ = 0.9 σ = 
Point to Multi-Point 30.2900 30.2800 30.3100 30.4800
CFG partially-connected D2D 20.1800 23.4702 30.4500 33.9300
for a low connectivity index (C ≤ 0.4), the proposed CFG partially-connected D2D approach
noticeably outperforms the fully-connected D2D and OCF partially-connected D2D approaches.
In such poorly connected networks (C ≤ 0.4), multiple simultaneous players’ transmissions are
exploited in partially D2D algorithms. However, as the connectivity index increases (C ≥ 0.6),
the number of formed disjoint coalitions in our proposed solution is drastically reduced, thus
reducing the number of transmitting players. This results in a performance agreement with
the fully-connected D2D scheme. Being independent of the coverage zones of the transmitting
players and the delay created by those players, the PMP scheme is not affected by the changes
to C. Thus, the PMP scheme has constant average completion time.
To conclude this section, we study the influence of the setting σ = 0.5 on the completion time
performance of our proposed scheme. In Table I, we summarize the completion time perfromance
for different values of σ. The considered network setup has 30 players, 20 packets,  = 0.5,
and C = 0.1. From Table I, we note that the completion time of our proposed solution still
outperforms the PMP scheme for σ = 0.7 and approximately reaches the same performance as
for the PMP scheme for σ = 0.9. This is due to the simultaneous transmissions and cooperative
decisions by the transmitting players, which show the potential of the proposed CFG solution
in minimizing the completion time of users.
C. Proposed CFG Perfromance Evaluation
To quantify the analysis of the proposed formation coalition solution, we plot in Fig. 8 the
average number of coalitions as a function of the number of players N for a network composed
of M = 30, a different connectivity index (C = 0.6, C = 0.3, and C = 0.1), and σ = 0.12.
Fig. 8 shows that the average coalition size increases with the increase in the number of players.
This is because, as N increases, the number of cooperating players increases, thus increasing the
average size of the formed coalitions. We can conclude from Fig. 8 that the resulting coalition
structure Ψfin from Algorithm 1 is composed of a small number of relatively large coalitions
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TABLE II
AVERAGE RUNNING TIMES OF THE DIFFERENT SCHEMES
Solution Time(s)- Small network Time(s)- Large network
FRAN partially-connected D2D 0.561893 15.98450
Point to Multi-Point 1.994500 1103.020716
Fully-connected D2D 0.756420 128.772580
OCF partially-connected D2D 0.783575 28.726515
CFG partially-connected D2D 0.736737 21.725739
TABLE III
AVERAGE NUMBER OF COALITIONS AND SPLIT/MERGE RULES OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME IN THE FIRST ITERATION
Network Setup Number of Coalitions Split-and-merge rules
Setup 1: N = 100 and C = 0.1 16.34 8.12
Setup 2: N = 160 and C = 0.1 23.67 12.76
when C = 0.6. When C = 0.1, this number of formed coalitions increase and the resulting
coalition structure Ψfin is composed of a large number of small coalitions’ sizes.
In Table II, we evaluate the complexity of the proposed coalition game solution as a function
of the algorithmic running time. In particular, Table II lists the consumed time of MATLAB to
execute all schemes in different network setups since starting the algorithms until all players
receive their wanted packets. The considered small network setup has 30 players, 20 packets,
 = 0.5, σ = 0.25, and C = 0.1. The considered large network setup has 100 players, 70 packets,
 = 0.5, σ = 0.25, and C = 0.1. It can clearly be seen from the table that the proposed CFG-
partially D2D scheme needs low consumed time than all other solutions for both network setups.
Although the completion time achieved by the CFG partially-connected D2D scheme is roughly
the same as the centralized FRAN partially-connected D2D, the computing time required by our
developed scheme is slightly higher than that required by the FRAN partially-connected D2D.
This is because our proposed scheme needs time to converge before generating the output. The
centralized FRAN scheme has low execution time due to the presence of the fog entity.
Finally, to evaluate the convergence rate analysis of the proposed scheme, the average number
of merge-and-split rules before Algorithm 1 converges to the final coalition structure is listed in
Table III. To achieve the stable coalition with our proposed CFG scheme, network setup 1 requires
on average 16 iterations, and network setup 2 needs on average 22 iterations. These results show
that our proposed distributed algorithm is robust to different network setups. In summary, these
results show that our proposed algorithm allows D2D users to form stable coalitions with a good
convergence speed, which further confirm the theoretical findings in Theorem 1.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a distributed game-theoretical framework for a partially connected
D2D network using coalition game and IDNC optimization. As such, the completion time of
users is minimized. In particular, our proposed model is formulated as a coalition formation game
with nontransferable utility, and a fully distributed coalition formation algorithm is proposed. The
proposed distributed algorithm is converged to a Nash-stable coalition structure using split-and-
merge rules while accounting for the altruistic players’ preferences. With such a distributed
solution, each player has to maintain a partial feedback matrix only for the players in its
coverage zone instead of the global feedback matrix required in the fully connected D2D
networks. A comprehensive completion time and game performances evaluation have been
carried out for the proposed distributed coalition game. In particular, our performance evaluation
results comprehensively demonstrated that our proposed distributed solution offers almost same
completion time performance similar to centralized FRAN D2D network.
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